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Abstract In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of represen-
tative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being
substantially influenced by the dominating player. We first provide the general theory and discuss the neces-
sary condition for the optimal controls and equilibrium condition by adopting adjoint equation approach. We
then present a special case in the context of linear-quadratic framework, in which a necessary and sufficient
condition can be asserted by stochastic maximum principle; we finally establish the sufficient condition that
guarantees the unique existence of the equilibrium control. The proof of the convergence result of finite player
game to mean field counterpart is provided in Appendix.
Keywords : Mean field games; Dominating player; Wasserstein Metric; Adjoint equation approach/Stochastic
maximum principle; Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations; Linear quadratic; Separation principle;
Banach fixed point theorem.
1 Introduction
For long, modeling the joint interactive behaviour of individual objects(agents) in a large population in vari-
ous dynamic systems has been one of the major problems. For instance, physicists often apply the traditional
variational methods in Lagrangian and/or Hamiltonian mechanics to study interacting particle systems, which
left a shortcoming of extremely high computational cost that made this microscopic approach almost math-
ematically intractable. To resolve this matter, a completely different macroscopic approach from statistical
physics had been gradually developed, which eventually leads to the primitive notion of mean field theory.
The novelty of this approach is that particles interact through a medium, namely the mean field term, which
aggregates by action and reaction on other particles. Moreover, by passing the number of particles to the
infinity in these macroscopic models, the mean field term become a functional of the density function which
represents the whole population of particles. This leads to mathematical problems of much less computational
complexity.
From the economic perspective, due to the dramatic population growth and rapid urbanization, urgent needs
of in-depth understanding of collective strategic interactive behavior of a huge group of decision makers is
crucial in order to maintain a sustainable economic growth. Since the vector of fair prices is determined by
A. Bensoussan
International Center for Decision and Risk Analysis,Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, College of Science and Engineering, City University of Hong
Kong
E-mail: axb046100@utdallas.edu
M. H. M. Chau, S. C. P. Yam
Department of Statistics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
E-mail: michaelchaumanho@gmail.com, scpyam@sta.cuhk.edu.hk
2 A. Bensoussan, M. H. M. Chau, S. C. P. Yam
both demand and supply, it is natural to utilize the aggregation effect from the players’ states as a canonical
candidate of mean-field term, and then we employ the mean-field models in place of the corresponding
classical equilibrium models; moreover, as the decision makers control the evolution of a dynamic system,
it is necessary to also incorporate the theory of stochastic differential games (SDGs) in these mean-field
models. Over the past few decades, the theory of SDGs has been a major research topic in control theory
and financial economics, especially in studying the continuous-time decision making problem between non-
cooperative investors; in regard to the one-dimensional setting the theory of two person zero-sum games is
quite well-developed via the notion of viscosity solutions, see for example Fleming and Souganidis (1989).
Unfortunately, most interesting SDGs are N -player non-zero sum SDGs; see Bensoussan and Frehse [2,3] and
Bensoussan et al. [4], yet there are still relatively few results in the literature.
As a macroscopic equilibrium model, et al. [10,11] investigated stochastic differential game problems involving
infinitely many players under the name “Large Population Stochastic Dynamic Games”; and independently,
Lasry and Lions [12,13,14] studied similar problems from the viewpoint of the mean-field theory in physics and
termed “Mean-Field Games (MFGs)”. As an organic combination of mean field theory and theory of stochastic
differential games, MFGs provide a more realistic interpretation of individual dynamics at the microscopic
level, so that each player will be able to optimize his prescribed objectives, yet with the mathematical
tractability in a macroscopic framework. To be more precise, the general theory of MFGs has been built
by combining various consistent assumptions on the following modeling aspects: (1) a continuum of players;
(2) homogeneity in strategic performance of players; and (3) social interactions through the impact of mean
field term. The first aspect is describing the approximation of a game model with a huge number of players
by a continuum one yet with a sufficient mathematical tractability. The second aspect is assuming that all
players obey the same set of rules of the interactive game, which provide guidance on their own behavior that
potentially leads them to optimal decisions. Finally, due to the intrinsic complexity of the society in which
the players participate in, the third aspect is explaining the fact that each player is so negligible and can only
affect others marginally through his own infinitesimal contribution to the society. In a MFG, each player will
base his decision making purely on his own criteria and certain summary statistics (that is, the mean field
term) about the community; in other words, in explanation of their interactions, the pair of personal and
mean-field characteristics of the whole population is already sufficient and exhaustive. Mathematically, each
MFG will possess the following forward-backward structure: (1) a forward dynamic describes the individual
strategic behavior; (2) a backward equation describes the evolution of individual optimal strategy, such as
those in terms of the individual value function via the usual backward recursive techniques. For the detail of
the derivation of this system of equations with forward-backward feature, one can consult from the works of
Huang et al. [11], Lasry and Lions [12,13,14] and Bensoussan et al. [5].
In this article, we consider a class of MFG problems, in which there is a ‘significantly big’ player playing
together with a huge group of ‘small’ players. The first work along this direction under a Linear Quadratic
setting has been investigated by Huang [9]. In their following work [16], the authors regard the mean field
term, represented by the conditional expectation of the small agent, as exogenous to the whole control problem
for both the big (the authors called it,‘major’) and small (minor) players. Nourian and Caines [18] consider a
similar problem under a generalized framework. However, the authors also consider the mean field term, which
is represented by a conditional probability measure, as exogenous to the control problem for the major player.
In contrast, we here consider the mean field term as endogenous for the big (we rephrase as ‘dominating’ in
order to emphasize our distinction from the previous works) player. That is to say, changes in the control of
the big (dominating) player would directly affect and even essentially determine the mean field term. Our
present setting appears to be natural in the economic literature related to ‘actual’ governance, as the governor
can often take up the initiative or key role on setting up rubrics and regulations to be followed by citizens.
To avoid ambiguity, we here regard the ‘dominating’ major player as a “Dominating Player”, and all other
minor players as “Representative Agents” throughout the whole paper. In our work, we assume that this
dominating player can influence both the mean field term and representative agents directly. We first discuss
the necessary condition for the optimality under the most general setting in which both the state coefficients
and the objective functions are sufficiently regular (e.g. differentiable); we then consider the Linear-Quadratic
case by applying the results obtained in the general theory, which results in three adjoint equations. It is
noted that Huang et al. [17] also considered the non-stationary case and obtained the intermediary result
with only two adjoint equations, which represents a particular case of our present theory. Besides, concerning
the related fixed point issue in any standard MFG problem in order to achieve the equilibrium strategy, we
here only need to involve one single affine map, that simplifies much than that in [17], in which the authors
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need a couple of two similar mappings; apart from the simplicity of the sufficient condition provided here, it
is also directly expressed in terms of the data (coefficients) of the underlying model.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the general theory of the Mean Field Games
in the presence of a dominating Player, in which both the state coefficients and the objective functions are
sufficiently regular. The necessary condition for optimality and equilibrium is also provided there. Firstly,
solving for the control problem of the representative agent, and then the equilibrium condition leads to a
coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker Planck equations. As the mean field term is endogenous to the
dominating Player, in order to achieve an optimal control, he/she should take into account of the coupled
equations when deciding his own controlling strategy. The related fixed point problem is described by six
equations. In Section 3, we study a special case with linear states together with linear quadratic objective
functions. Due to natural coerciveness of the problem formulation, a necessary and sufficient condition for the
optimality can be guaranteed. We write down both the stochastic maximum principle and the corresponding
adjoint equations. In Section 4, the corresponding fixed point problem is then tackled by considering the
related Riccati equation, with which the equilibrium could be achieved. We then provide a ‘practical’ sufficient
condition, which only involves the data (coefficients) of the model without referring to any specific solution
of any Riccati equations, for the existence of the equilibrium strategy. In Appendix, proof of the approximate
Nash equilibrium for the general setting is also provided.
2 General Theory
Consider a probability space (Ω,F , P ), a fixed terminal time T and two independent standard Brownian
motion W0(t) and W1(t) taking values in R
d0 and Rd1 respectively. Also consider two independent initial
square integrable random variables ξ0 ∈ Rn0 and ξ1 ∈ Rn1 , which are also assumed to be independent of both
W0(t) and W1(t). Define the filtrations as follows, in which F0t and F1t are clearly independent to each other,
F0t := σ(ξ0,W0(s), s ≤ t),
F1t := σ(ξ1,W1(s), s ≤ t),
Gt := F0t ∨ F1t .
Let P2(Rn1) be the space of probability measures equipped with the 2nd Wasserstein metric (for example,
see [21]), W2(·, ·) such that for any µ and ν in P2(Rn1),
W2(ν1, ν2) := inf
γ∈Γ (ν1,ν2)
(∫
Rn×Rn
|x− y|2dγ(x, y)
) 1
2
,
where the infimum is taken over the family Γ (ν1, ν2), the collection of all joint measures with respective
marginals ν1 and ν2. Denote dλ to be the Lebesgue measure on R
n1 .
Denote x0(t) ∈ Rn0 and x1(t) ∈ Rn1 the state evolutions for the dominating player and a representative agent
respectively whose dynamics are given by the following stochastic differential equations (SDEs),

dx0 = g0
(
x0(t), µ(t), u0(x0(t), t)
)
dt+ σ0
(
x0(t)
)
dW0(t),
x0(0) = ξ0.
dx1 = g1
(
x1(t), x0(t), µ(t), u1(x1t)
)
dt+ σ1
(
x1(t)
)
dW1(t),
x1(0) = ξ1.
(1)
The functional coefficients are defined as follows:

g0 : R
n0 × P2(Rn1)× Rm0 → Rn0 ,
g1 : R
n1 × Rn0 × P2(Rn1)× Rm1 → Rn1 ,
σ0 : R
n0 → Rn0×d0 ,
σ1 : R
n1 → Rn1×d1 .
(2)
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The dominating player and the representative agents also possess the following objective functionals respec-
tively:
J0(u0) = E
[∫ T
0 f0
(
x0(t), µ(t), u0(t)
)
dt+ h0
(
x0(T ), µ(T )
)]
,
J1(u1, x0, ν) = E
[∫ T
0
f1
(
x1(t), x0(t), µ(t), u1(t)
)
dt+ h1
(
x1(T ), x0(T ), µ(T )
)]
.
The functions are defined as follows:


f0 : R
n0 × P2(Rn1)× Rm0 → R,
f1 : R
n1 × Rn0 × P2(Rn1)× Rm1 → R,
h0 : R
n0 × P2(Rn1)→ R,
h1 : R
n1 × Rn0 × P2(Rn1)→ R.
(3)
Here u0 ∈ Rm0 and u1 ∈ Rm1 represent the respective controls of the dominating player and the representative
agent. The controls u0 and u1 are respectively adapted to the filtrations F0t and Gt. We further assume that
the functional form (being a function of (x1(t), t)) of u1 is adapted to F0t and uniformly Lipschitz in x1(t),
even though its value evaluated at x1(t) would be adapted to Gt instead. Loosely speaking the dominating
player takes his own privilege of setting up the framework to be followed by the representative agent. We
shall then define the classes of admissible controls for the dominating player and the representative agent by
A0 and A1 respectively, where A0 (resp. A1) is a subset of F0− (resp. G−)progressively measurable process
which are in L2(Ω × [0, T ];Rm0) (resp. L2(Ω × [0, T ];Rm1)).
The mean field term, µ(t) ∈ P2(Rn1), is the probability measure of the state of the representative agent at
time t. Indeed, the dominating player sets rules for representative agent to take into account. One natural
consideration is that the dominating player is incapable of tracing the state of each individual’s evolution,
but only takes account of the overall performance of the community subject to the rules he set, that is his
own flow of information, F0t . By the same token, each agent cannot fully keep track of any other agents’
states and they can only rely on the summarized information of the community provided by the dominating
player. Thus it is justifiable to assume that the mean field term, µ(t), is adapted to F0t . The dominating
player can directly influence both the representative agent and the mean field term, thus we consider µ(t) as
endogenous in the consideration of optimal behavior of x0(t) rather than as an exogenous variable commonly
found in the literature such as that of [9,18].
For any probability measure µ ∈ P2(Rn1), we write M2(µ) = (
∫
Rn1
|x|2dµ(x)) 12 . We first give the following
assumptions on the functional coefficients:
(A.1) Lipschitz Continuity
g0, σ0, g1 and σ1 are globally Lipschitz continuous in all arguments. In particular, there exists K > 0, such
that
|g0(x0, µ, u0)− g0(x′0, µ′, u′0)| ≤ K
(
|x0 − x′0|+W2(µ, µ′) + |u0 − u′0|
)
;
|σ0(x0)− σ0(x′0)| ≤ K|x0 − x′0|.
|g1(x1, x0, µ, u1)− g1(x′1, x′0, µ′, u′1)| ≤ K
(
|x1 − x′1|+ |x0 − x′0|+W2(µ, µ′) + |u1 − u′1|
)
;
|σ1(x1)− σ1(x′1)| ≤ K|x1 − x′1|.
(A.2) Linear Growth
g0, σ0, g1 and σ1 are of linear growth in all arguments. In particular, there exists K > 0, such that
|g0(x0, µ, u0)| ≤ K(1 + |x0|+M2(µ) + |u0|);
|σ0(x0)| ≤ K(1 + |x0|).
|g1(x1, x0, µ, u1)| ≤ K(1 + |x0|+ |x1|+M2(µ) + |u1|);
|σ1(x1)| ≤ K(1 + |x1|).
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(A.3) Quadratic Condition on the Cost Functional (See (A.5) in Carmona and Delarue [7].)
There exists K > 0, such that
|f1(x1, x0, µ, u1)− f1(x′1, x′0, µ′, u′1)| ≤K
[
1 + |x1|+ |x′1|+ |x0|+ |x′0|+ |M2(µ)|+ |M2(µ′)|+ |u1|+ |u′1|
]
·
[
|x1 − x′1|+ |x0 − x′0|+W2(µ, µ′) + |u1 − u′1|
]
;
|h1(x1, x0, µ)− h1(x′1, x′0, µ′)| ≤K
[
1 + |x1|+ |x′1|+ |x0|+ |x′0|+ |M2(µ)|+ |M2(µ′)|
]
·
[
|x1 − x′1|+ |x0 − x′0|+W2(µ, µ′)
]
.
(4)
Under the assumptions A.1-A.3, we show in the Appendix that if we have the mean field term coincides with
the probability measure of x1(t) conditioning on F0t , then the optimization problem for the representative
agent constitutes to a Mean Field Game. In general, it is more convenient to compare two probability measures
if they possess density functions on Rn1 . We define the second order operator A1 and its adjoint A
∗
1 by
A1ϕ(x, t) = −tr
(
a1(x)D
2ϕ(x, t)
)
,
A∗1ϕ(x, t) = −
n1∑
i,j=1
∂2
∂xi∂xj
(
a
ij
1 (x)ϕ(x, t)
)
,
where a1(x) =
1
2σ1(x)σ1(x)
∗ is a positive definite matrix. Let x1 = x
u1
1 be the solution of the SDE for the
representative agent with respect to control u1. For any test function f , by Itoˆ’s lemma,
E
F0t [f(xu11 (t))] = E
F0t
[
f(ξ1) +
∫ t
0
(
∂t + g ·D +A1
)
fds
]
, (5)
The conditional density function pu1(·, t) of xu11 (t) (if exists), i.e. EF
0
t [f(xu11 (t))] =
∫
Rn1
f(x)pu1 (x, t)dx, would
be given by the Fokker-Planck (FP) equation

∂pu1
∂t
= −A∗1pu1(x, t) − div
(
g1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), u1(x, t)
)
pu1(x, t)
)
,
pu1(x, 0) = ω(x),
(6)
where ω(x) is the initial density function of ξ1. We will justify the existence and regularities of the conditional
density function pu1 later. We first assume pu1(·, t) ∈ L2(Rn1) and pu1(·, t)dλ ∈ P2(Rn1). For any density m,
we may write mdλ = m if no ambiguity arises. We impose further assumptions on the functional coefficients:
(A.4)
g0, f0, h0, g1, f1 and h1 are continuously differentiable in (if the argument exist) x0 ∈ Rn0 , x1 ∈ Rn1 u0 ∈ Rm0 ,
u1 ∈ Rm1 with bounded derivatives. We will denote, for example, the derivative of g0 with respect to x0 by
g0,x0 . They are also Gaˆteaux differentiable in µ = mdλ ∈ P2(Rn1), for example, for m ∈ L2(Rn1),
d
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
g0(xi, (m+ θm˜)dλ, ui) =
∫
Rn
∂g0
∂m
(xi,mdλ, ui)(ξ)m˜(ξ)dξ,
for some ∂g0
∂m
(xi,mdλ, ui) ∈ L2(Rn1).
(A.5)
σ0 (resp. σ1) is twice continuously differentiable in x0 ∈ Rn0 (resp. x1 ∈ Rn1) with bounded first order and
second order derivative.
Remark With the regularities on the coefficients, if we have the initial density ω(x) ∈ L2 ∩ L∞(Rn1), then
the FP equation (6) admits a unique solution pu1 ∈ L∞([0, T ],L2 ∩L∞(Rn1)). See Proposition 4 and 5 in Le
Bris and Lions [6] for details.
Define then a pair of mutually dependent control problems for the dominating player and the representative
agent as below:
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Problem 21 Control of Representative Agent
Given the process x0 and an exogenous probability measure-valued process ν (adapted to F0t ), find a control
u1 ∈ A1 which minimizes the cost functional
J1(u1, x0, ν) := E
[∫ T
0
f1
(
x1(t), x0(t), ν(t), u1(t)
)
dt+ h1
(
x1(T ), x0(T ), ν(T )
)]
. (7)
Problem 22 Equilibrium Condition
Given an exogenous probability measure-valued process ν, let M(ν)(t) be the measure induced by the corre-
sponding optimal x1(t) found in Problem 21 conditioning on F0t . Find the probability measure-valued process
µ such that the fixed point property is satisfied: M(µ)(·) = µ(·).
Problem 23 Control of the Dominating Player
Find a control u0 ∈ A0 which minimizes the cost functional
J0(u0) := E
[∫ T
0
f0
(
x0(t), µ(t), u0(t)
)
dt+ h0
(
x0(T ), µ(T )
)]
, (8)
where µ is the solution given in Problem 22.
Remark The setting of our problem is different from those mean field related problems with a major player
(not a dominating player) commonly found in the literature, such as that in [9,18]. For example, in [9], the
corresponding objective functions for the major player and i-th minor player are respectively
J0(u0, z) = E
∫ T
0
{|x0 −H0z − η|2Q0 + u∗0R0u0} dt,
Ji(ui, z) = E
∫ T
0
{
|xi −Hx0 − Hˆ0z − η|2Q + u∗Ru
}
dt,
where the mean field term z is exogenous to both control optimization problems for J0 and Ji. Instead, we
here consider the mean field term ν, as established in Problem 22, as endogenous for the dominating player
in Problem 23. In particular, changes in control u0 would affect and even completely determine the mean field
term ν accordingly. Our setting appears to be natural in the economic context related to governance, as the
governor can sometimes take the initiative to set-up rubrics to be obeyed and followed by citizens; this latter
notion is covered in [8].
We first establish the necessary condition of optimality for the representative agent (Problem 21) by the
adjoint equation approach. After resolving Problem 21, we solve for the fixed point in Problem 22. Recall
that x0(t), the functional form of u1 (conditioning on F t0, u1 is a function of (x1(t), t)) and now together with
the input measure-valued process ν are all adapted to F0t . We can then rewrite the cost functional (7) for
the representative agent as
J1(u1, x0, ν) =E
[ ∫ T
0
E
F0t f1
(
x1(t), x0(t), ν(t), u1(x1(t), t)
)
dt+ EF
0
T h1
(
x1(T ), x0(T ), ν(T )
)]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
Rn1
pu1(x, t)f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
dxdt+
∫
Rn
pu1(x, T )h1
(
x, x0(T ), ν(T )
)
dx
]
.
Lemma 24 (Necessary condition for Problem 21)
Given x0 and ν as in Problem 21, the control uˆ1 ∈ A1 is optimal only if it satisfies the following SHJB:

−∂tΨ =
(
H1(x, x0(t), ν(t), DΨ(x, t)) −A1Ψ(x, t)
)
dt−KΨ (x, t)dW0(t),
Ψ(x, T ) = h1
(
x, x0(T ), ν(T )
)
,
(9)
where
H1(x, x0, ν, q) = inf
u1
L(x, x0, ν, u1, q),
L(x, x0, ν, u1, q) = f1(x, x0, ν, u1) + qg1(x, x0, ν, u1).
and the infimum is uniquely attained at uˆ1, i.e. H1(x, x0, ν, q) = L(x, x0, ν, uˆ1, q).
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Remark As in the work in Carmona et al. [7], one convenient set of assumptions on g1,f1 and h1 which
ensures the unique existence of the minimizer, uˆ1(x, x0, ν, q) = argminuL(x, x0, ν, u, q), is the affine and
convexity assumption. See Lemma 2.1 in [7] for more details. In particular, for x1 ∈ Rn1 ;x0 ∈ Rn0 ;µ ∈
P2(Rn1) and u1, u′1 ∈ Rm1 , there exists K > 0 such that
1. g1(x1, x0, µ, u1) = g1,1(x1, x0, µ) + g1,2 · u1,
2. f1(x
′
1, x0, µ, u
′
1) ≥ f1(x1, x0, µ, u1)+f∗1,x1(x1, x0, µ, u1)(x′1−x1)+f∗1,u1(x1, x0, µ, u1)(u′1−u1)+K|u′1−u1|2.
Moreover, the minimizer (x, q) 7→ uˆ1(x, x0, µ, q) is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (x0, µ). Similar con-
ditions for g0, f0 and h0 can be assumed to guarantee a unique minimizer for the Lagrangian of the control
problem for the dominating player in Lemma 26.
Proof To express a necessary condition for optimality, we adopt the stochastic maximum principle. In par-
ticular, for any u˜1 ∈ A1,
0 =
d
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
J1(uˆ1 + θu˜1, x0, ν)
=
d
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
Rn1
puˆ1+θu˜1(x, t)f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), uˆ1(x, t) + θu˜1(x, t)
)
dxdt
+
∫
Rn
puˆ1+θu˜1(x, T )h1
(
x, x0(T ), ν(T )
)
dx
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
+ puˆ1(x, t)f1,u1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
u˜1(x, t)dxdt
+
∫
Rn
p˜(x, T )h1
(
x, x0(T ), ν(T )
)
dx
]
,
(10)
where p˜ = d
dθ
∣∣
θ=0
puˆ1+θu˜1 . By taking derivative with respect to θ in the FP equation (6), we have


∂p˜
∂t
= −A∗1p˜(x, t)− div
(
u˜1(x, t)g1,u1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
puˆ1(x, t)
)
−div
(
g1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
p˜(x, t)
)
,
p˜(x, 0) = 0.
As an adjoint process, we consider the backward stochastic differential equation


−∂tΨ =
{
f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
+DΨ(x, t)g1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
−A1Ψ(x, t)
}
dt
−KΨ (x, t)dW0(t),
Ψ(x, T ) = h1
(
x, x0(T ), ν(T )
)
.
We consider the inner product
d
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)Ψ(x, t)dx
=
∫
Rn1
{
−A∗1p˜(x, t)− div
(
u˜1(x, t)g1,u1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
puˆ1(x, t)
)
−div
(
g1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
p˜(x, t)
)}
Ψ(x, t)dxdt
−
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)
{
f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
+DΨ(x, t)g1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
−A1Ψ(x, t)
}
dxdt
+
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)KΨ (x, t)dxdW0(t)
=
∫
Rn1
(
u˜1(x, t)g1,u1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
puˆ1(x, t)
)
DΨ(x, t)dxdt
−
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
dxdt+
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)KΨ (x, t)dxdW0(t).
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Taking integration on [0, T ] and expectation on both sides yields
E
[ ∫
Rn
p˜(x, T )h1
(
x, x0(T ), ν(T )
)
dx
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
Rn1
(
u˜1(x, t)g1,u1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
puˆ1(x, t)
)
DΨ(x, t)dxdt
−
∫ T
0
∫
Rn1
p˜(x, t)f1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), u1(x, t)
)
dxdt
]
.
Together with the first order condition (10), we have
0 = E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
Rn1
u˜1(x, t)
[
g1,u1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
DΨ(x, t) + f1,u1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)]
puˆ1(x, t)dxdt
]
.
Recall that the puˆ1(·, t) is a conditional probability density function and hence non-negative, and u˜1 is an
arbitrary Markovian control, we have uˆ1 is optimal only if
g1,u1
(
x, x0(t), µ(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
DΨ(x, t) + f1,u1
(
x, x0(t), ν(t), uˆ1(x, t)
)
= 0, a.e.(x, t).
With the definition of L in the theorem, the condition becomes
Lu1(x, x0(t), ν(t), uˆ1(x, t), DΨ(x, t)) = 0, a.e.(x, t),
which provides a necessary condition for the minimization problem. As the minimizer is assumed to be
attained at uˆ1, which depends on x, x0, ν, and DΨ , we arrive for the SHJB Equation. ⊓⊔
Replace the arbitrary measure ν by the mean field measure µ. Equating µ := mx0dλ with puˆ1dλ, the measure
of the optimal state of the representative agent conditioning on F0t ; the couple (6) and (9) give the following
corollary.
Corollary 25 (Necessary condition for Problems 21 and 22)
The control for the representative agent is optimal and the equilibrium condition holds only if the SHJB-FP
coupled equations are satisfied


−∂tΨ =
(
H1
(
x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t)
)
−A1Ψ(x, t)
)
dt−KΨ (x, t)dW0(t),
Ψ(x, T ) = h1(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T )).
∂mx0
∂t
= −A∗1mx0(x, t) − div
(
G1
(
x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t)
)
mx0(x, t)
)
,
mx0(x, 0) = ω(x),
(11)
where G1(x, x0,m, q) = g1(x, x0,m, uˆ1(x, x0,m, q)).
The SHJB-FP coupled equations (11) allow us to obtain the control of the representative agent in terms of
a given trajectory of the dominating player x0 while the equilibrium condition also holds.
We then turn to the optimal problem for the dominating player. As mx0 is not external to the dominating
player, the dominating player has to consider both its own dynamic evolution and (11).
Lemma 26 Necessary condition for Problem 23
The control for the dominating player uˆ0 is optimal only if
f0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) + p · g0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) = inf
u0
{
f0(x0,mx0 , u0) + p · g0(x0,mx0 , u0)
}
: = H0(x0,mx0 , p)
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where p(t) satisfies the following adjoint processes
−dp =
[
g∗0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))p(t) + f0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))
+
∫
G1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))Dq(x, t)mx0(x, t)dx
+
∫
r(x, t)H1,x0 (x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))dx
]
dt
−∑d0l=1K lp(t)dW l0(t) +∑d0l=1 σl∗0,x0(x0(t))K lp(t)dt,
p(T ) = h0,x0(x0(T ),mx0(x, T )) +
∫
r(x, T )h1,x0(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))dx;
−∂tq =
[
−A1q(x, t) + p(t)∂g0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), uˆ0(t))(x)
+Dq(x, t)G1(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))
+
∫
Dq(ξ, t)
∂G1
∂m
(ξ, x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), DΨ(ξ, t))(x)mx0 (ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
r(ξ, t)
∂H1
∂m
(ξ, x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), DΨ(ξ, t))(x)dξ
+
∂f0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(x)
]
dt−Kq(x, t)dW0(t),
q(x, T ) =
∂h0
∂m
(x0(T ),mx0(ξ, T ))(x) +
∫
r(ξ, T )
∂h1
∂m
(ξ, x0(T ),mx0(ξ, T ))(x)dξ;
∂r
∂t
= −A∗1r(x, t) − div
[
r(x, t)H1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))
+G1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))Dq(x, t)mx0 (x, t)
]
,
r(x, 0) = 0.
Proof Again we consider the Gaˆteaux derivative
0 =
d
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
J0(uˆ0 + θu˜0)
=E
{∫ T
0
[f0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))x˜0(t) +
∫
∂f0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(ξ)m˜x0 (ξ, t)dξ
+ f0,u0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))u˜0(t)]dt
+ h0,x0(x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))x˜0(T ) +
∫
∂h0
∂m
(x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))(ξ)m˜x0(ξ, T )dξ
}
,
(12)
where x˜0 =
d
dθ
∣∣
θ=0
x0(uˆ0 + θu˜0); m˜x0 =
d
dθ
∣∣
θ=0
mx0(uˆ0 + θu˜0); Ψ˜ =
d
dθ
∣∣
θ=0
Ψ(uˆ0 + θu˜0), satisfy
dx˜0 =
[
g0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))x˜0(t) +
∫
∂g0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(ξ)m˜x0(ξ, t)dξ
+g0,u0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))u˜0(t)
]
dt+
∑d0
l=1 σ
l
0,x0(x0(t))x˜0(t)dW
l
0(t),
x˜0(0) = 0;
∂m˜x0
∂t
= −A∗1m˜x0(x, t)− div
{[
G1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))x˜0(t)
+
∫
∂G1
∂m
(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))(ξ)m˜x0 (ξ, t)dξ
+G1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))DΨ˜ (x, t)
]
mx0(x, t)
+G1(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))m˜x0 (x, t)
}
,
m˜x0(x, 0) = 0;
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−∂tΨ˜ =
[
H1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))x˜0(t)
+
∫
∂H1
∂m
(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))(ξ)m˜x0 (ξ, t)dξ
+H1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))DΨ˜ (x, t)−A1Ψ˜(x, t)
]
dt−KΨ˜ (x, t)dW0(t),
Ψ˜(x, T ) = h1,x0(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))x˜0(T ) +
∫
∂h1
∂m
(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))(ξ)m˜x0(ξ, T )dξ.
Introduce the adjoint processes p(t), q(x, t) and r(x, t) as stated in the lemma statement and consider the
following differentials
d(p∗x˜0)
= −x˜∗0(t)
[
f0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t)) +
∫
r(x, t)H1,x0 (x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))dx
+
∫
G1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))Dq(x, t)mx0(x, t)dx
]
dt
+p∗(t)
[ ∫
∂g0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(ξ)m˜x0(ξ, t)dξ
+g0,u0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))u˜0(t)
]
dt+ {. . . } dW0(t).
d
∫
q(x, t)m˜x0(x, t)dx
=
∫
q(x, t)
[
− div
[
[G1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))x˜0(t)
+G1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))DΨ˜ ]mx0(x, t)
]]
dxdt
−
∫ [
p(t)
∂g0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), uˆ0(t))(x) +
∫
r(ξ, t)
∂H1
∂m
(ξ, x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), DΨ(ξ, t))(x)dξ
+
∂f0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(x)
]
m˜x0(x, t)dxdt + {. . . } dW0(t).
d
∫
r(x, t)Ψ˜ (x, t)dx
=
∫ [
− div
[
G1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))Dq(x, t)mx0 (x, t)
]]
Ψ˜(x, t)dxdt
−
∫
r(x, t)
[
H1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))x˜0(t)
+
∫
∂H1
∂m
(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))(ξ)m˜x0 (ξ, t)dξ
]
dxdt+ {. . . } dW0(t).
Using the results above, we have
d
{
p∗x˜0 +
∫
q(x, t)m˜x0(x, t)dx −
∫
r(x, t)Ψ˜ (x, t)dx
}
=
[
− x˜∗0(t)f0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t)) + p∗(t)g0,u0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))u˜0(t)
−
∫
∂f0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(x)m˜x0(x, t)dx
]
dt+ {. . . } dW0(t).
Integrating and taking expectation on both sides gives
E
[
(h0,x0(x0(T ),mx0(x, T )) +
∫
r(x, T )h1,x0(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))dx)x˜0(T )dx
+
∫ [∂h0
∂m
(x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))(x) +
∫
r(ξ, T )
∂h1
∂m
(ξ, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))(x)dξ
]
m˜x0(x, T )dx
−
∫
r(x, T )
[
h1,x0(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))x˜0(T ) +
∫
∂h1
∂m
(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))(ξ)m˜x0(ξ, T )dξ
]
dx
]
= E
∫ T
0
{
− x˜∗0(t)f0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t)) + p∗(t)g0,uˆ0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))u˜0(t)
−
∫
∂f0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(x, t), uˆ0(t))(x)m˜x0 (x, t)dx
}
dt.
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Finally we consider (12) and obtain
0 = E
∫ T
0
{
f0,uˆ0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) + p
∗g0,u0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0)
}
u˜0dt.
Since u˜0 is arbitrary, the control is optimal for the dominating player only if
f0,u0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) + p
∗g0,u0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) = 0, a.e. t.
Again, we are considering a minimization problem with the first order condition given above. Since the unique
existence of a minimizer, uˆ0 is assumed, we conclude that uˆ0 satisfies the infimum
f0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) + p · g0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0) = inf
u0
{
f0(x0,mx0 , u0) + p · g0(x0,mx0 , u0)
}
.
⊓⊔
Let G0(x,mx0 , p) = g0(x0,mx0 , uˆ0(x0,mx0 , p)). We then conclude the main result in this section.
Theorem 27 The necessary condition for Problems 21, 22 and 23 is provided by the following six equations


dx0 = G0(x0(t),mx0(t)(t), p(t))dt+ σ0(x0(t))dW0(t),
x0(0) = ξ0.
∂mx0
∂t
= −A∗1mx0(x, t)− div
(
G1
(
x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t)
)
mx0(x, t)
)
,
mx0(x, 0) = ω(x),
−∂tΨ =
(
H1
(
x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t)
)
−A1Ψ(x, t)
)
dt−KΨ (x, t)dW0(t),
Ψ(x, T ) = h1(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T )).


−dp =
[
H0,x0(x0(t),mx0(x, t), p(t)) +
∫
r(x, t)Hx0 (x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))dx
+
∫
G1,x0(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))Dq
∗(x, t)mx0(t)(x, t)dx
]
dt
−∑d0l=1K lp(t)dW l0(t) +∑d0l=1 σl∗0,x0(x0(t))K lp(t)dt,
p(T ) = h0,x0(x0(T ),mx0(x, T )) +
∫
r(x, T )h1,x0(x, x0(T ),mx0(x, T ))dx;
−∂tq =
[
−A1q(x, t) + ∂H0
∂m
(x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), p(t))(x)
+Dq(x, t)G1(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))
+
∫
Dq(ξ, t)
∂G1
∂m
(ξ, x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), DΨ(ξ, t))(x)mx0(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
r(ξ, t)
∂H1
∂m
(ξ, x0(t),mx0(ξ, t), DΨ(ξ, t))(x)dξ
]
dt−Kq(x, t)dW0(t),
q(x, T ) =
∂h0
∂m
(x0(T ),mx0(ξ, T ))(x) +
∫
r(ξ, T )
∂h1
∂m
(ξ, x0(T ),mx0(ξ, T ))(x)dξ;
∂r
∂t
= −A∗1r(x, t) − div
[
r(x, t)H1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))
+G1,q(x, x0(t),mx0(x, t), DΨ(x, t))Dq(x, t)mx0(x, t)
]
,
r(x, 0) = 0.
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3 Linear Quadratic Case
In this section we present a special case of the problem in the Linear Quadratic setting in which both necessary
and sufficient condition could be established. Suppose that the state evolutions of the processes x0(t), x1(t)
are described by 

dx0 =
(
A0x0(t) +B0z(t) + C0u0(x0(t), t)
)
dt+ σ0dW0(t),
x0(0) = ξ0.
dx1 =
(
A1x1(t) +B1z(t) + C1u1(x1(t), t) +Dx0(t)
)
dt+ σ1dW1(t),
x1(0) = ξ1.
To simplify, the matrices A0, C0, B0, σ0; A1, C1, B1, D, σ1 are assumed to be constant though the case with
time dependent and deterministic function are similar. For if the dominating player did not exist, it is
customary to consider z(t) as deterministic, and the equilibrium condition is
z(t) = Ex1(t). (13)
We can first find an optimal stochastic control for the representative agent given z, then solve for the fixed
point equation (13). However, one cannot assume z(t) to be deterministic when the dominating player exists,
which induces a two-layer problem. Since the dominating player can directly influence the mean field term in
the present setting, z(t) should be adapted to the filtration F0t . The equilibrium condition hence is
z(t) = EF
0
t x1(t) =
∫
ξmx0(t)(ξ, t)dξ. (14)
We define control problems for both the dominating player and the representative agent and fist solve for the
control problem of the representative agent as if both x0(t) and z(t) as exogenous. The next problem is to
solve the equilibrium condition (14) as a fixed point property. Finally we solve for the control problem of the
dominating player, but now z(t) is regarded as endogenous.
For any vector v and matrix M with appropriate dimensions, we write the inner product v∗Mv as |v|2M
for simplicity. Problems 21, 22 and 23 can now be rewritten in the present Linear Quadratic framework as
follows:
Problem 31 Control of the Representative Agent
Given the process x0 and κ, find a control u1 ∈ A1 which minimizes the cost functional
J1(u1, x0, κ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
(|x1(t)− E1κ(t)− Fx0(t)− ζ1|2Q1 + u∗1(t)R1u1(t))dt
+ |x1(T )− E¯1κ(T )− F¯ x0(T )− ζ¯1|2Q¯1
]
.
Problem 32 Equilibrium Condition
Let x1 := x1,κ be the trajectory of the representative agent with the optimal control found in Problem 31. Find
the process z(t) such that the fixed point property is satisfied
z(t) = EF
0
t x1,z(t),
Problem 33 Control of the Dominating Player
Find a control u0 ∈ A0 which minimizes the cost functional
J0(u0) = E
[ ∫ T
0
(|x0(t)− E0z(t)− ζ0|2Q0 + u∗0(t)R0u0(t))dt
+ |x0(T )− E¯0z(T )− ζ¯0|2Q¯0
]
,
where z is the solution given in Problem 32.
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For simplicity, E0, F,R0, R1, E1, ζ0, ζ1, Q0, Q1 are constant matrices and vectors; Q0, Q1, R0, R1 are positive
symmetric and invertible. Note that Problems 31 and 33 are strictly convex quadratic and coercive, we can
write the stochastic principle.
Lemma 34 (Control of Representative Agent)
Problem 31 is uniquely solvable and the optimal control uˆ1(t) is −R−11 C∗1n(t), where n satisfies the adjoint
process 

−dn =
(
A∗1n(t) +Q1(x1(t)− E1κ(t)− Fx0(t)− ζ1)
)
dt− Zn,0(t)dW0(t)− Zn,1(t)dW1(t),
n(T ) = Q¯1
(
x1(T )− E¯1κ(T )− F¯ x0(T )− ζ¯1
)
.
Proof Consider a perturbation of the optimal control uˆ1 + θu˜1, where u˜1 is adapted to the filtration Gt. The
original state x1 becomes x1 + θx˜1 with
 dx˜1 =
(
A1x˜1(t) + C1u˜1(t)
)
dt,
x˜1(0) = 0.
the optimality of uˆ1 is expressed by the following Euler condition
0 =
d
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
J1(uˆ1 + θu˜1, x0, κ)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
[x˜∗1(t)Q1(x1(t)− E1κ(t)− Fx0(t)− ζ1) + u˜∗1(t)R1uˆ1(t)]dt
+ x˜∗1(T )Q¯1(x1(T )− E¯1κ(T )− F¯ x0(T )− ζ¯1)
]
On the other hand, we have
d(n∗x˜1) =
(
n∗(t)C1u˜1(t)− x˜∗1(t)Q1(x1(t)− E1κ(t)− Fx0(t)− ζ1)
)
dt
+ x˜1(t)Zn,0(t)dW0(t) + x˜1(t)Zn,1(t)dW1(t).
Integrate both side and take expectation, combining with the Euler condition, it becomes
E
∫ T
0
(n∗(t)C1 + uˆ
∗
1(t)R1)u˜1(t)dt = 0, ∀u˜1(·) adpated to G,
which implies, together with an application of tower property,
uˆ1(t) = −R−11 C∗1n(t). (15)
Therefore the stochastic maximum principle for the representative agent is expressed by the system

dx1 =
(
A1x1(t) +B1κ(t)− C1R−11 C∗1n(t) +Dx0(t)
)
dt+ σ1dW1(t),
x1(0) = ξ1.
−dn =
(
A∗1n(t) +Q1(x1(t)− E1κ(t)− Fx0(t)− ζ1)
)
dt− Zn,0(t)dW0(t)− Zn,1(t)dW1(t),
n(T ) = Q¯1
(
x1(T )− E¯1κ(T )− F¯ x0(T )− ζ¯1
)
.
(16)
and hence for every exogenous pair (x0, κ), this system defines a unique pair (x1, n). By the convexity and
coerciveness of the cost functional, uˆ1 is uniquely defined and the sufficient condition is automatically satisfied.
⊓⊔
Remark The optimal control has the representation −R−11 C∗1n(t) = −R−11 C∗1 (Ptx1(t) + g(t)), where P
satisfies the symmetric Riccati equation{
P˙t + PtA1 +A
∗
1Pt − PtC1R−11 C∗1Pt +Q1 = 0,
PT = Q¯1;
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and g satisfies the BSDE

−dg =
(
(A1 − C1R−11 C∗1Pt)∗g(t) + (PtB1 −Q1E1) + (PtD −Q1F )x0(t)κ(t) −Q1ζ1
)
dt
−Zg,0(t)dW0(t)− Zg,1(t)dW1(t),
g(T ) = Q¯1
(
− E¯1κ(T )− F¯ x0(T )− ζ¯1
)
.
To obtained the equilibrium condition stated in Problem (32), we simply take expectation conditional on F0t
on both sides of Equation (16). By requiring EF
0
t x1(t) = z(t), and replace κ(t) by z(t), we have the following
system, which is analogical to the SHJB-FP (11) in Section 2.

dz =
(
(A1 +B1)z(t)− C1R−11 C∗1m(t) +Dx0(t)
)
dt+ σ1dW1(t),
z1(0) = E[ξ1].
−dm =
(
A∗1m(t) +Q1(I − E1)z(t)−Q1Fx0(t)−Q1ζ1
)
dt− Zm(t)dW0(t),
m(T ) = Q¯1(I − E¯1)z(T )− Q¯1F¯ x0(T )− Q¯1ζ¯1.
(17)
We next proceed on the problem of the dominating player.
Lemma 35 (Control of the Dominating Player)
Problem 33 is uniquely solvable and the optimal control uˆ0(t) is −R−10 C∗0p(t), where p satisfies

−dp =
(
A∗0p(t) +D
∗q(t)− (Q1F )∗r(t) +Q0(x0(t)− E0z(t)− ζ0)
)
dt− Zp(t)dW0(t),
p(T ) = F¯ ∗Q¯1r(T ) + Q¯0(x0(T )− E¯0z(T )− ζ¯0).
−dq =
(
(A1 +B1)
∗q(t) +B∗0p(t) + (I − E1)∗Q∗1r(t) − E∗0Q0(x0(t)− E0z(t)− ζ0)
)
dt− Zq(t)dW0(t),
q(T ) = (I − E¯1)∗Q¯1r(T )− E¯∗0 Q¯0(x0(t)− E¯0z(t)− ζ¯0).
dr =
(
A1r(t) − C1R−11 C∗1q(t)
)
dt,
r(0) = 0.
(18)
Proof Consider uˆ0 + θu˜0 the perturbation of the optimal control, where u˜0 is adapted to the filtration F0t .
The original states x0, z, m become x0 + θx˜0, z + θz˜, m+ θm˜ with

dx˜0 =
(
A0x˜0(t) +B0z˜(t) + C0u˜0(t)
)
dt,
x˜(0) = 0.
dz˜ =
(
(A1 +B1)z˜(t)− C1R−11 C∗1m˜(t) +Dx˜0(t)
)
dt,
z˜(0) = 0.
−dm˜ =
(
A∗1m˜(t) +Q1(I − E1)z˜(t)−Q1F x˜0(t)
)
dt− Zm˜dW0(t)
m˜(T ) = Q¯1(I − E¯1)z˜(T )− Q¯1F¯ x˜0(T ).
The corresponding maximum principle for uˆ0 is
0 =
d
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
J0(uˆ0 + θu˜0)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
[(x˜0(t)− E0z˜(t))∗Q0(x0(t)− E0z(t)− ζ0) + uˆ∗0R0u˜0]dt
+ (x˜0(T )− E¯0z˜(T ))∗Q0(x0(T )− E¯0z(T )− ζ¯0)
] (19)
On the other hand, we can easily check that
d(p∗x˜0 + q
∗z˜ − r∗m˜) =
(
p∗(t)C0u˜0(t)− (x˜0(t)− E0z˜(t))∗Q0(x0(t)− E0z(t)− ζ0)
)
dt+ {. . . }dW0(t).
Mean Field Games with a Dominating Player 15
Integrating and also taking expectation on both sides of the last equation, together with an application of
(19), we deduce that
E
∫ T
0
(p∗C0 + uˆ
∗
0R0)u˜0dt = 0, ∀u˜0 adapted to F0t ,
which implies the desired result by again the application of tower property,
uˆ0(t) = −R−10 C∗0p(t)(t). (20)
⊓⊔
Summarizing the results we obtained so far, we present the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 36 The necessary and sufficient conditions for the unique existence of the solution to Problems
31, 32 and 33 are described by the following six equations in matrix form

d


x0
r
z

 =




A0 0 B0
0 A1 0
D 0 A1 +B1




x0(t)
r(t)
z(t)


−


C0R
−1
0 C
∗
0 0 0
0 C1R
−1
1 C
∗
1 0
0 0 C1R
−1
1 C
∗
1




p(t)
q(t)
m(t)



 dt+


σ0
0
0

 dW0,


x0(0)
r(0)
z(0)

 =


ξ0
0
E[ξ1]

 .


−d


p
q
m

 =




A∗0 D
∗ 0
B∗0 A
∗
1 +B
∗
1 0
0 0 A∗1




p(t)
q(t)
m(t)


+


Q0 −(Q1F )∗ −Q0E0
−(Q0E0)∗ (Q1(I − E1))∗ E∗0Q0E0
−Q1F 0 Q1(I − E1)




x0(t)
r(t)
z(t)

+


−Q0ζ0
E∗0Q0ζ0
−Q1ζ1



 dt−


Zp(t)
Zq(t)
Zm(t)

 dW0(t),


p(T )
q(T )
m(T )

 =


Q¯0 −(Q¯1F¯ )∗ −Q¯0E¯0
−Q¯0E¯0)∗ (Q¯1(I − E¯1))∗ E¯∗0 Q¯0E¯0
Q¯1F 0 Q¯1(I − E¯1)




x0(t)
r(t)
z(t)

+


−Q¯0ζ¯0
E¯∗0 Q¯0ζ¯0
−Q¯1ζ¯1

 .
(21)
Remark One can easily compare these six equations with those stated in Theorem 27. We obtain the same
results by applying the general theory, however, it is more convenient to acquire these six equations directly
under the Linear Quadratic setting, which also illuminates the power of using the principle of separation. On
comparison with the intermediary result obtained in [17]. The latter work did not take account of the third
adjoint equation r since it fails to consider the impact on m with respect to the change of the control of the
dominating player.
4 Fixed Point Problem
In this section, we provide a sufficient condition, which solely depends on the coefficients of the mean field
game system, for the unique existence of the solution to Problems 31, 32 and 33 by means of tackling a
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non-symmetric Riccati equation. To facilitate our argument, we define
x :=


x0
r
z

 ; p :=


p
q
m

 ; Z :=


Zp
Zq
Zm

 .
Hence we can write (21) as

 dx =
(
(A+ B)x(t)− Cp(t)
)
dt+ σdW0(t),
x(0) = ξ.
 −dp =
(
A∗p(t) + (Q+ S)x(t) + k
)
dt− Z(t)dW0(t),
p(T ) = (Q¯+ S¯)x(T ) + k¯,
(22)
where
A :=


A0 B0 0
D A1 +B1 0
0 0 A1

 ; B :=


0 −B0 B0
−D −B1 0
D 0 B1

 ; C :=


C0R
−1
0 C
∗
0 0 0
0 C1R
−1
1 C
∗
1 0
0 0 C1R
−1
1 C
∗
1

 ;
σ :=


σ0
0
0

 ; ξ :=


ξ0
0
0

 ; Q+ S :=


Q0 −F ∗Q1 −Q0E0
−E∗0Q0 (I − E1)∗Q∗1 E∗0Q0E0
−Q1F 0 Q1(I − E1)

 ; k :=


−Q0ζ0
E∗0Q0ζ0
−Q1ζ1

 ;
Q¯+ S¯ :=


Q¯0 −(Q¯1F¯ )∗ −Q¯0E¯0
−Q¯0E¯0)∗ (Q¯1(I − E¯1))∗ E¯∗0 Q¯0E¯0
Q¯1F 0 Q¯1(I − E¯1)

 ; k¯ :=


−Q¯0ζ¯0
E¯∗0 Q¯0ζ¯0
−Q¯1ζ¯1

 ,
where Q and Q¯ are positive matrices. Consider the following non-symmetric Riccati equation
{
Γ˙ +A∗Γt + Γt(A+ B)− ΓtCΓt + (Q+ S) = 0,
ΓT = Q¯;
(23)
and the backward ODE 
 −dg =
(
(A∗ − ΓtB)g(t) + k
)
dt,
g(T ) = k¯.
(24)
It is easy to check that p(t) = Γtx(t)+g(t). With respect to this affine form, the forward backward equation
(22) admits a unique solution if and only if (23) admits a unique solution. In accordance with Theorem 2.4.3
in Ma and Young [15] or [1], we have the following proposition.
Proposition 41 Suppose the following forward-backward ordinary differential equations


dX
dt
= (A+ B)X(t)− CY (t)
X(0) = 0.
−
dY
dt
= A∗Y (t) + (Q+ S)X(t),
Y (T ) = (Q¯+ S¯)X(T ).
admits a unique solution for any t0 ∈ [0, T ]. Then there is a unique solution of (23).
Our next theorem concludes the results in this section.
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Theorem 42 Let φ(s, t) be the fundamental solution to A. Suppose that(
1 +
√
T‖φ‖T · ‖BQ− 12 ‖
)(
1 +N(S)
)
< 2,
where ‖ · ‖ stands for usual Euclidean norm. Then there exists a unique solution of equation (21), and hence
a unique (mean field) equilibrium exists. Here,
‖φ‖T := sup
0≤t≤T
√
‖φ∗(T, t)Q¯ 12 ‖2 +
∫ T
t
‖φ∗(s, t)Q 12 ‖2ds
and
N(S) = max{‖Q¯−12 S¯Q¯− 12 ‖, ‖Q− 12SQ− 12 ‖}
Proof Let x, y be elements in the Hilbert Space H2([0, T ];Rn0+n1+n1) endowed with the inner product
〈x, y〉H = x∗(T )Q¯y(T ) +
∫ T
0
x∗(s)Qy(s)ds
Furthermore, ‖·‖H := |〈·, ·〉|
1
2
H stands for the induced norm under this inner product. We consider the forward
backward ordinary differential equation

dX
dt
= AX(t)− CY (t) + Bx(t)
X(0) = 0.
−
dY
dt
= A∗Y (t) +QX(t) + Sx(t),
Y (T ) = Q¯X(T ) + S¯x(T ).
(25)
Observe that both C and Q are positive definite, Equation (25) corresponds a well-defined (deterministic)
control problem. Hence, x 7→ X is well defined in H2. It suffices to show that this mapping is indeed a
contraction. Consider the inner product
d
dt
(X∗Y ) = −Y ∗(t)CY (t) + Y ∗(t)Bx(t)−X∗(t)QX(t)−X∗(t)Sx(t).
Taking integration on [0, T ] yields
X∗(T )Q¯X(T ) +
∫ T
0
X∗(t)QX(t)dt = X(T )∗S¯x(T ) +
∫ T
0
−Y ∗(t)CY (t) + Y ∗(t)Bx(t)−X∗(t)Sx(t)dt.
By the positivity of C, and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
‖X‖2H ≤ ‖Q¯−
1
2 S¯Q¯− 12 ‖ ·
(
X∗(T )Q¯ 12 · Q¯ 12x(T )
)
+‖Q−12SQ− 12 ‖ ·
∫ T
0
X∗(t)Q 12 · Q 12x(t)dt +
∫ T
0
Y ∗(t)Bx(t)dt
≤ N(S)
(
‖X‖H · ‖x‖H
)
+
∫ T
0
Y ∗(t)Bx(t)dt.
(26)
On the other hand, for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Y (t) = φ∗(T, t)
(
Q¯X(T ) + S¯x(T )
)
+
∫ T
t
φ∗(s, t)
(
QX(s) + Sx(s)
)
ds
= φ∗(T, t)Q¯ 12
(
Q¯ 12X(T ) + Q¯− 12 S¯x(T )
)
+
∫ T
t
φ∗(s, t)Q 12
(
Q 12X(s) +Q− 12Sx(s)
)
ds
which implies
sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖Yt‖ ≤ ‖φ‖T
(
‖X‖H +N(S)‖x‖H
)
. (27)
Combining Equations (26) and (27) yields
‖X‖2H ≤ N(S)
(
‖X‖H · ‖x‖H
)
+
√
T‖φ‖T
(
‖X‖H +N(S)‖x‖H
)
‖BQ 12 ‖‖x‖H
which shows that x 7→ X is a contraction if(
1 +
√
T‖φ‖T · ‖BQ− 12 ‖
)(
1 +N(S)
)
< 2.
⊓⊔
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, by adopting adjoint equation approach, we provide the general theory and discuss the necessary
condition for optimal controls for both the dominating player and the representative agent, and study the
corresponding fixed point problem in relation to the equilibrium condition. A convenient necessary and suffi-
cient condition has been provided under the Linear Quadratic setting; in particular, a illuminative sufficient
condition, which only involves the coefficient of the mean field game system, for the unique existence of the
equilibrium control has been given. Finally, proof of the convergence result of finite player game to mean
field counterpart is provided in Appendix. Applications of the present model in connection with central bank
lending and systematic risk in financial context will be provided in the future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 ǫ-Nash Equilibrium
We now establish that the solutions of Problems 21 and 22 is an ǫ-Nash Equilibrium. Suppose that there are N representative
agents behaving in similar manner, so that the state of the dominating player and the i-th agent satisfies the following SDE
respectively: 

dy0 = g0
(
y0(t),
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
y
j
1(t)
, u0(t)
)
dt+ σ0
(
y0(t)
)
dW0(t),
y0(0) = ξ0.


dyi1 = g1
(
yi1(t), y0(t),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
y
j
1(t)
, ui1(t)
)
dt+ σ1
(
yi1(t)
)
dW i1(t),
yi1(0) = ξ
i
1.
(28)
where δy is Dirac measure with a unit mass at y. We call Equation (28) the empirical system. The corresponding objective
functional for the i-th agent is:
JN,i(u) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f1
(
yi1(t), y0(t),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
y
j
1(t)
, ui(t)
)
dt+ h1
(
yi1(T ), y0(T ),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
y
j
1(T )
)]
,
where u = (u11, u
2
1, . . . , u
N
1 ). We expect that when N →∞, the hypothetical approximation is described by (1), that is:

dx0 = g0
(
x0(t), mx0(t), u0(t)
)
dt+ σ0
(
x0(t)
)
dW0(t),
x0(0) = ξ0.


dxi1 = g1
(
xi1(t), x0(t), mx0(t), u
i
1(t)
)
dt+ σ1
(
xi1(t)
)
dW i1(t),
xi1(0) = ξ
i
1.
(29)
We call Equation (29) the mean field system. The corresponding limiting objective functional for the i-th player is
J i(ui1) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f1
(
xi1(t), x0(t), mx0(t), u
i
1(t)
)
dt + h1
(
xi1(T ), x0(T ), mx0(T )
)]
. (30)
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Using Corollary 25, the necessary condition for optimality is described by the SHJB-FP coupled equation (11). To proceed, we
assume that the optimal control uˆ = (uˆ11, uˆ
2
1, . . . , uˆ
N
1 ) exists. To avoid ambiguity, denote xˆ
i
1 and yˆ
i
1 the states dynamics of x
i
1 and
yi1 corresponding to the optimal control uˆ
i
1. The mean field term mx0(t), is the probability measure of the optimal trajectory xˆ
i
1
at time t, conditioning on F0t . Under this construction, being conditional on F0t , {xˆi1}i are identical and independent processes;
while {yˆi1}i are dependent on each other through the empirical distribution. For simplicity, for two density functions m and m′,
we write W2(mdλ,m′dλ) = W2(m,m′).
Lemma A1 Suppose the assumptions (A.1-A.3) hold. If mx0(t) is chosen to be the density function of xˆ
i
1 conditional on Ft0,
then
E
[
sup
u≤T
|y0(u) − x0(u)|2
]
+ E
[
sup
u≤T
|yˆi1(u)− xˆi1(u)|2
]
= O( 1
N
).
Proof Observe that for any t ∈ [0, T ]
E sup
u≤t
|y0(u) − x0(u)|2 ≤ C
{
tE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣g0
(
y0(s),
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
, u0(s)
)
− g0
(
x0(s), mx0(s), u0(s)
)∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣σ0
(
y0(s)
)
− σ0
(
x0(s)
)∣∣∣∣
2
ds
}
,
and
E sup
u≤t
|yˆi1(u)− xˆi1(u)|2 ≤ C
{
tE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣g1
(
yˆi1(s), y0(s),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
, uˆi1(s)
)
− g1
(
xˆi1(s), x0(s), mx0(s), uˆ
i
1(s)
)∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣σ1
(
yˆi1(s)
)
− σ1
(
xˆi1(s)
)∣∣∣∣
2
ds
}
,
By the Lipschitz assumptions, we have
E sup
u≤t
|y0(u) − x0(u)|2 + E sup
u≤t
|yˆi1(u) − xˆi1(u)|2
≤ C
{
tE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣y0(s)− x0(s)
∣∣∣2 +W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(s)
)
ds+ E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣y0(s) − x0(s)
∣∣∣2ds
}
+C
{
tE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣yˆi1(s)− xˆi1(s)
∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣y0(s)− x0(s)
∣∣∣2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(t)
)
ds+ E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣yi1(s)− xi1(s)
∣∣∣2ds
}
≤ C
{
E
∫ t
0
sup
u≤s
∣∣∣y0(u)− x0(u)
∣∣∣2 + sup
u≤s
∣∣∣yˆi1(u)− xˆi1(u)
∣∣∣2
+W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(s)
)
ds
}
,
(31)
where C > 0 is a constant, changing line by line, depends only on T and K. By definition, for any Dirac measures δy on Rn1
and density function m, we have
W 22 (δy ,m) =
∫
Rn1
|y − x|2dm(x).
Also observe that the joint measure 1
N
∑N
j=1 δ(yˆj1(s),xˆ
j
1(s))
on Rn1 × Rn1 has respective marginals 1
N
∑N
j=1 δyˆj1(s)
and 1
N
∑N
j=1 δxˆj1(s)
on Rn1 . Using the definition of Wasserstein metric, we evaluate
E
[
W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)]
≤ E
[ ∫
R
n1×Rn1
|y − x|2d
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
(yˆ
j
1(s),xˆ
j
1(s))
(y, x)
)]
≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1
E
∣∣∣yˆj1(s) − xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2
= E
∣∣∣yˆi1(s)− xˆi1(s)
∣∣∣2,
(32)
where the last equality results from the fact that {yˆj − xˆj}Nj=1 are symmetric. Similarly, we also have
E
[
W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)]
≤ E
∣∣∣yˆi1(s) − xˆi1(s)
∣∣∣2.
Combining with (31) and applying Gronwall’s inequality, we have
E sup
u≤t
|y0(u) − x0(u)|2 + E sup
u≤t
|yˆi1(u) − xˆi1(u)|2
≤ CeCtE
[ ∫ t
0
W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
, mx0(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(s)
)
ds
]
.
(33)
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By definition of the Wasserstein metric, we have
W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
, mx0(s)
)
= inf
Γ
∫
R
n1
∫
R
n1
|x− y|2dΓ(
1
N
∑
N
j=1 δxˆj
1
(s)
,mx0(s)
)(x, y)
≤
∫
Rn1
∫
Rn1
|x|2 − 2x · y + |y|2d
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
(x)dmx0(s)(y)
=
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
xˆ
j
1(s)
∣∣∣2 − 2( 1
N
N∑
j=1
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
· EF0s xˆj1(s) + EF
0
s |xˆj1(s)|2
=
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
xˆ
j
1(s) − EF
0
s xˆ
j
1(s)
∣∣∣2
Hence,
E
[
W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
, mx0(s)
)]
≤ 1
N2
E
[ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣xˆj1(s)− EF0s xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2 + 2
N∑
j<k
[xˆj1(s)− EF
0
s xˆ
j
1(s)] · [xˆk1(s) − EF
0
s xˆk1(s)]
]
Recall that given F0t , {xˆj1}j are identically and independently distributed, we thus get
E
[
W 22
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(s)
)]
≤ 1
N2
E
[ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣xˆj1(s) − EF0s xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2 + 2
N∑
j<k
[EF
0
s xˆ
j
1(s)− EF
0
s xˆ
j
1(s)] · [EF
0
s xˆk1(s)− EF
0
s xˆk1(s)]
]
=
1
N2
E
[ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣xˆj1(s) − EF0s xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2 + 0
]
=
1
N
E
∣∣∣xˆj1(s)− EF0s xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2.
Similar estimate applies on the second term in Equation (33). Put t = T , we finally have
E sup
u≤T
|y0(u)− x0(u)|2 + E sup
u≤T
|yˆi1(u) − xˆi1(u)|2
≤ Ce
CT
N
E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣∣xˆj1(s) − EF0s xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2ds
]
≤ 4Ce
CT
N
E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣∣xˆj1(s)
∣∣∣2ds
] (34)
With the linear growth assumptions, for any t ∈ [0, T ], we easily get the estimates
E sup
u≤t
|x0(t)|2 ≤ CE
{
|ξ0|2 +
∫ t
0
sup
u≤s
|x0(u)|2 + EF
0
s |xˆj1(s)|2 + |u0(s)|2ds
}
and
E sup
u≤t
|xˆj1(t)|2 ≤ CE
{
|ξj1|2 +
∫ t
0
sup
u≤s
|xˆj1(u)|2 + sup
u≤s
|x0(u)|2 + EF
0
s |xˆj1(s)|2 + |uˆj1(s)|2ds
}
Applying the Tower property of expectation and the Gronwall’s inequality on the sum of the two inequalities above yields
E sup
u≤t
|x0(t)|2 + E sup
u≤t
|xˆj1(t)|2 ≤ CeCtE
{
|ξ0|2 + |ξj1|2 +
∫ t
0
|uˆj1(s)|2 + |u0(s)|2ds
}
<∞
We have the order for the estimate (34)
E sup
u≤T
|y0(u)− x0(u)|2 + E sup
u≤T
|yˆi1(u) − xˆi1(u)|2 = O(
1
N
). (35)
⊓⊔
We also have approximation for the cost functionals.
Lemma A2
JN,i(uˆ)−J i(uˆi1) = O(
1√
N
).
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Proof With the quadratic assumptions (4), we have
|JN,i(uˆ) −J i(uˆi)| ≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
f1
(
yˆi1(t), y0(t),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(t)
, uˆi(t)
)
− f1
(
xˆi1(t), x0(t), mx0(t), uˆ
i
1(t)
)
dt
+h1
(
yˆi1(T ), y0(T ),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(T )
)
− h1
(
xˆi1(T ), xˆ0(T ), mx0(T )
)]
≤ CE
[ ∫ T
0
[
1 + |yˆi1(t)| + |xˆi1(t)| + |y0(t)|+ |x0(t)|+
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i |yˆj1(t)|2
N − 1
) 1
2
+
(
E
F0t |xˆi1(t)|2
) 1
2
+ 2|uˆi(t)|
]
·
[
|yˆi1(t) − xˆi1(t)| + |y0(t) − x0(t)|+W2
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(t)
,mx0(t)
)]
dt
+
[
1 + |yˆi1(T )|+ |xˆi1(T )| + |y0(T )|+ |x0(T )|+
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i |yˆj1(T )|2
N − 1
) 1
2
+
(
E
F0t |xˆi1(T )|2
) 1
2
]
·
[
|yˆi1(T ) − xˆi1(T )|+ |y0(T ) − x0(T )|+W2
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(T )
, mx0(T )
)]]
.
An application of Ho¨lder’s inequality, and the symmetry on {xˆj1}j gives
|JN,i(uˆ)− J i(uˆi)| ≤ C
{[
E
∫ T
0
[
1 + |yˆi1(t)|2 + |xˆi1(t)|2 + |y0(t)|2 + |x0(t)|2 +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i |yˆj1(t)|2
N − 1 + E
F0t |xˆi1(t)|2 + |uˆi(t)|2
]
dt
] 1
2
·
[
E
∫ T
0
[
|yˆi1(t) − xˆi1(t)|2 + |y0(t) − x0(t)|2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(t)
, mx0(t)
)]
dt
] 1
2
+
[
E
[
1 + |yˆi1(T )|2 + |xˆi1(T )|2 + |y0(T )|2 + |x0(T )|2 +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i |yˆj1(T )|2
N − 1 + E
F0t |xˆi1(T )|2
]] 12
·
[
E
[
|yˆi1(T )− xˆi1(T )|2 + |y0(T )− x0(T )|2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(T )
,mx0(T )
)]] 12}
= C
{[
E
∫ T
0
[
1 + |yˆi1(t)|2 + |xˆi1(t)|2 + |y0(t)|2 + |x0(t)|2 + |uˆi(t)|2
]
dt
] 1
2
·
[
E
∫ T
0
[
|yˆi1(t) − xˆi1(t)|2 + |y0(t) − x0(t)|2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(t)
,mx0(t)
)]
dt
] 1
2
+
[
E
[
1 + |yˆi1(T )|2 + |xˆi1(T )|2 + |y0(T )|2 + |x0(T )|2
]] 12
·
[
E
[
|yˆi1(T )− xˆi1(T )|2 + |y0(T )− x0(T )|2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(T )
,mx0(T )
)]] 12}
By the linear growth assumptions on g0, σ0, g1 and σ1, it is easy to show that
E
∫ T
0
[
1 + |yˆi1(t)|2 + |xˆi1(t)|2 + |y0(t)|2 + |x0(t)|2 + |uˆi(t)|2
]
dt
and
E
[
1 + |yˆi1(T )|2 + |xˆi1(T )|2 + |y0(T )|2 + |x0(T )|2
]
are bounded (independent of N). We finally arrive at the estimates
|JN,i(uˆ)− J i(uˆi)| ≤ C
{[
E
∫ T
0
[
|yˆi1(t) − xˆi1(t)|2 + |y0(t) − x0(t)|2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(t)
,mx0(t)
)]
dt
] 1
2
+
[
E
[
|yˆi1(T ) − xˆi1(T )|2 + |y0(T ) − x0(T )|2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(T )
, mx0(T )
)]] 12}
,
which goes to 0 as N →∞, as shown in Lemma A1. Hence
|JN,i(uˆ)−J i(uˆi1)| = O(
1√
N
).
⊓⊔
In the previous lemmas, we assumed that all players adopt their corresponding mean field optimal controls. By symmetry, the
convergences of state dynamics and the cost functionals are then established. To show that the mean field optimal controls u
indeed constitute a ǫ-Nash equilibrium on the empirical system, without loss of generality, we assume that the first player did
not obey the mean field optimal control. In particular, let u11 be an arbitrary control in A1, define u := (u11, uˆ21, . . . , uˆN1 ). We
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then have the following empirical and mean field SDEs for the dominating player, the 1-st player and the i-th player (i > 1)
respectively: 

dy0 = g0
(
y0(t),
1
N
(
δy11(t)
+
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(t)
)
, u0(t)
)
dt + σ0
(
y0(t)
)
dW0(t),
y0(0) = ξ0.
dx0 = g0
(
x0(t), mx0(t), u0(t)
)
dt+ σ0
(
x0(t)
)
dW0(t),
x0(0) = ξ0.
(36)


dy11 = g1
(
y11(t), y0(t),
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(t)
, u11(t)
)
dt+ σ1
(
y11(t)
)
dW 11 (t),
y11(0) = ξ
1
1 .
dx11 = g1
(
x11(t), x0(t), mx0(t), u
1
1(t)
)
dt+ σ1
(
x11(t)
)
dW 11 (t),
x11(0) = ξ
1
1 .
(37)


dyˆi1 = g1
(
yˆi1(t), y0(t),
1
N − 1
(
δy11(t)
+
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(t)
)
, uˆi1(t)
)
dt+ σ1
(
yˆi1(t)
)
dW i1(t),
yˆi1(0) = ξ
i
1.
dxˆi1 = g1
(
xˆi1(t), x0(t), mx0(t), uˆ
i
1(t)
)
dt + σ1
(
xˆi1(t)
)
dW i1(t),
xˆi1(0) = ξ
i
1.
(38)
We claim that if mx0 is the density function of xˆ
i
1 conditioning on F0, then we have the convergence y0 → x0, y11 → x11 and
yˆi1 → xˆi1 in the sense of the following lemma
Lemma A3
E
[
sup
u≤T
|y0(u)− x0(u)|2
]
+ E
[
sup
u≤T
|y11(u) − x11(u)|2
]
+ E
[
sup
u≤T
|yˆi1(u)− xˆi1(u)|2
]
→ 0, as N →∞.
Proof We first show the convergence of the dominating player and the i-th player. Similar to the proof of Lemma A1, we first
have
E sup
u≤t
|y0(u) − x0(u)|2 + E sup
u≤t
|yˆi1(u) − xˆi1(u)|2
≤ C
{
tE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣y0(s)− x0(s)
∣∣∣2 +W 22
( 1
N
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,mx0(s)
)
ds+ E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣y0(s) − x0(s)
∣∣∣2
}
ds
+C
{
tE
∫ t
0
∣∣∣yˆi1(s)− xˆi1(s)
∣∣∣2 +
∣∣∣y0(s)− x0(s)
∣∣∣2 +W 22
( 1
N − 1
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,mx0(s)
)
ds+ E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣yˆi1(s)− xˆi1(s)
∣∣∣2
}
ds
≤ CE
∫ t
0
[
sup
u≤s
∣∣∣y0(u)− x0(u)
∣∣∣2 + sup
u≤s
∣∣∣yˆi1(u)− xˆi1(u)
∣∣∣2
+W 22
( 1
N
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
, mx0(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,
1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22 (
1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
, mx0(s)
)]
ds
(39)
By the same argument used in Equation (32) in Lemma A1, we have
E
[
W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)]
+ E
[
W 22 (
1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
,
1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
)
]
≤ 2E|yˆi1(s)− xˆi1|2.
Hence, by applying Gronwall’s inequality on Equation (39), we have
E sup
u≤t
|y0(u)− x0(u)|2 + E sup
u≤t
|yˆi1(u)− xˆi1(u)|2
≤ CeCtE
∫ t
0
[
W 22
( 1
N
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
,mx0(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 1
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,
1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
+W 22
( 1
N − 2
N∑
j=2,j 6=i
δ
xˆ
j
1(s)
, mx0(s)
)]
ds
(40)
Mean Field Games with a Dominating Player 23
For the first term in (40), consider the following joint measure on Rn1 × Rn1
µ(x, y) =
1
N
N∑
j=2
δ
(yˆ
j
1(s),yˆ
j
1(s))
(x, y) +
1
N(N − 1)
N∑
j=2
δ
(y11(s),yˆ
j
1(s))
(x, y),
which has respective marginals
1
N
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
and
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
.
By the definition of Wasserstein metric,
E
[
W 22
( 1
N
(
δy11(s)
+
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)
,
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δ
yˆ
j
1(s)
)]
≤ E
[ ∫
R
n1×Rn1
|x− y|2dµ(x, y)
]
= E
[ 1
N(N − 1)
N∑
j=2
|y11(s)− yˆj1(s)|2
]
=
1
N
E|y11(s)− yˆ21(s)|2,
where the last equality results from symmetry on {yj1}j , clearly goes to 0 as N → ∞. Similar argument applies for the third
term in (40). For the convergence of the second and the forth term, we refer to the argument in the last part of Lemma A1 and
the results follow.
For the convergence of the 1-st player, the procedure are similar and we do not provide here. ⊓⊔
We conclude from the similar procedures to show the convergence of the cost functional. In particular, we have
|JN,1(u) −J 1(u11)| = O(
1√
N
).
Theorem A4 uˆ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Proof Summarizing all the obtained results in this section, we can conclude
|JN,1(uˆ)−J 1(uˆ11)| = O(
1√
N
);
|JN,1(u) −J 1(u11)| = O(
1√
N
).
Since uˆ11 is optimal control, we have J 1(uˆ11) ≤ J 1(u11). We deduce
JN,i(uˆ) ≤ JN,1(u) + O( 1√
N
).
Hence, uˆ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
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